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Free Riding in Noncooperative Entry 
Deterrence with Differentiated Products 
Dan Kovenock* and Suddhasatwa Royt 
We examine free riding and underinvestment in noncooperative entry deterrence in the Gilbert and 
Vives (1986) model with differentiated products. Our analysis proves that for products that are 
differentiated enough, when both entry allowing and entry deterring equilibria coexist, the symmetric 
entry deterring equilibrium may Pareto dominate the entry equilibrium. Hence, "coordination failure" 
underinvestment in entry prevention can occur. However, as claimed, the overinvestment result of 
Gilbert and Vives remains robust to moderate amounts of product differentiation. We also show that 
coordination failure underinvestment arises in a wide variety of entry deterrence models and does not 
rely on assumptions regarding strategic substitutability or complementarity of precommitments. 
JEL Classification: L13 
1. Introduction 
This paper reexamines the phenomenon of free riding in entry deterrence when established firms in 
an 
oligopoly are unable to coordinate their entry preventing activities. Previous authors (e.g., Bernheim 
1984; Gilbert and Vives 1986; Waldman 1987, 1991; Appelbaum and Weber 1992) have highlighted 
the public good aspect of noncooperative entry prevention?if costly entry deterring actions are 
successfully undertaken by a proper subset of the incumbents, then incumbents outside of that subset 
cannot be excluded from the benefits of deterred entry. It is in this sense that entry deterrence acquires 
the nature of a public good. This observation has prompted previous researchers to raise the "free rider" 
question (with its associated welfare implications): Can there occur underinvestment in entry deterrence 
due to the incentive for each firm to free ride on the others' (costly) entry preventing activities? 
The free rider problem in entry deterrence is first mentioned in the sequential entry model of 
Bernheim (1984). However, though Bernheim discusses the possibility of free riding in his model, the 
free rider problem is not the main focus of his paper. In fact, as pointed out by Waldman (1987, p. 
309, footnote 2), the author's discussion of the role of the free rider problem is "... somewhat vague 
as 
regards whether Bernheim feels the free rider problem would ever be important in a noncooperative 
entry deterrence setting."1 
Gilbert and Vives (1986) is the first paper in which the underinvestment issue is explicitly 
addressed. The authors define underinvestment in entry deterrence to be associated with one or more 
of the following: 
"(a) Incumbents' total profits are higher preventing than allowing entry, but the (unique) industry 
equilibrium allows entry. 
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(b) Either entry prevention or entry may be an industry equilibrium, but incumbents' profits are 
higher when entry is prevented. 
(c) An established monopoly (or colluding incumbents) prevents entry in more situations than an 
established, noncooperating oligopoly." (p. 77) 
Label (a), (b), and (c) as underinvestment of type 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Gilbert and Vives 
(G&V) go on to show that in none of these respects is there underinvestment in their quan 
tity setting homogeneous product model. On the contrary, they demonstrate a strong possibility of 
overinvestment. 
G&V consider a situation where symmetric noncooperative incumbents with constant marginal 
costs of production make credible commitments to outputs in the preentry stage.2 The entrant incurs 
a fixed entry cost if it enters the industry and makes its entry and output decision after observing the 
incumbents' output choices. Consequently, there exists a "limit output," which if jointly produced by 
the oligopoly, deters entry.3 G&V find that entry is prevented when limit outputs are small, while 
entry is allowed for larger limit outputs. For limit outputs in an intermediate range, both allowing 
entry and preventing entry are equilibria. They prove that in this intermediate range where both entry 
accommodating and entry preventing equilibria coexist, the unique entry equilibrium Pareto domi 
nates every deterrence equilibrium. In other words, compared with any deterrence equilibrium (there 
is typically a continuum of such equilibria) the accommodation equilibrium yields strictly higher 
profits to every incumbent. Hence, if the industry settles on an entry preventing equilibrium, the 
implication is that overinvestment exists because, by jointly reducing incumbents' outputs and 
allowing entry, every incumbent can be made better off. 
This paper introduces product differentiation into the G&V model and shows that sufficiently 
large amounts of product differentiation can generate underinvestment in entry prevention. The 
intuition is straightforward. Consider an incumbent's profit in any entry deterring equilibrium where 
exactly the limit output is produced by the oligopoly. In the homogeneous good model, the price of 
the product is always the (constant) price that clears the limit output, regardless of how the limit 
output is distributed among the incumbents. This, coupled with constant marginal costs, implies that 
each incumbent's profit is continuously increasing in its own output or, equivalently, decreasing in 
rival's 
output.4 Consequently, each firm wants the largest share in the limit output?an incentive that 
rules out the possibility of underinvestment. However, with differentiated products, the larger an 
incumbent's share of the limit output is, the smaller the price is. There are, then, two opposing forces 
at work: An increase in an incumbent's share of the limit output has a positive influence on its profit, 
but the resultant fall in price has a negative effect on profit. When the second effect outweighs the 
first, the incumbent's deterrence profit need not be continuously increasing in own output, that is, it 
can be increasing in the other's quantity over some range and decreasing over other ranges.5 This 
could weaken an incumbent's incentive to have the largest share in the entry deterring output and 
could generate underinvestment. Note that, starting from the homogenous good benchmark, in 
creasing the degree of product differentiation strengthens the second effect, that is, for sufficiently 
2 See Allen et al. (2000) for an interpretation of output precommitment as a reduced form for capacity in a three-stage game of 
sequential capacity choice followed by simultaneous price setting. 3 The limit output Z is determined by the level of the fixed entry cost F, for example, Z = max(0,l ? c ? 2y/F) in the case of 
a symmetric duopoly with a constant unit cost of production c and a linear inverse demand curve P 
= 
max(0,l ? Q). 
4 Incumbent i's profit at an entry deterring equilibrium is given by [P(Z) - c] q?, where P(.) is the inverse demand function, c is 
the constant marginal cost, and [P(Z) - c] is a fixed number. 
5 We shall henceforth use the term "deterrence profit" to refer to an incumbent's maximum profit from deterring entry for given 
levels of its rivals' choice variable. 
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differentiated products, an increase in rival output (and a consequent decrease in own output) raises 
own price to such an extent that its positive effect on profit more than compensates for the negative 
effect on profit of a lower own share of the limit output, thereby resulting in a deterrence profit that is 
increasing in rival output over the relevant range.6 
We formalize this intuition by incorporating the differentiated products demand structure of 
Vives (1985) into the G&V model. Using G&V's methodology, the equilibria of the game are char 
acterized in terms of the limit output. Focusing on the region where both entry allowing and entry 
deterring equilibria exist, we show that underinvestment of type 2 is a distinct possibility, namely, the 
entry allowing equilibrium may be Pareto dominated by an entry deterring equilibrium. We call this 
type of underinvestment "coordination failure" underinvestment?there exists an equilibrium where 
entry is deterred, but coordination failure may lead to one that allows entry and yields lower payoffs to 
all incumbents. This sort of underinvestment can arise even when type 1 and type 3 underinvestment 
are absent and is more likely with greater amounts of product differentiation. However, moderate 
amounts of product differentiation preserve the G&V overinvestment result. We demonstrate that 
coordination failure underinvestment, in our model, can occur only if each incumbent's entry deter 
ring profit is increasing in its rival's output at the point at which it is indifferent between allowing 
entry and preventing entry. A numerical example of underinvestment is also provided. 
Bernheim (1984) is the first paper to recognize the possibility of coordination failure underin 
vestment by pointing out the existence of one type of equilibrium in which each incumbent firm 
makes a zero investment in entry deterrence and equilibria of a second type where investments are just 
sufficient to deter entry. However, since the second kind of equilibria exist if and only if entry 
deterrence is jointly profitable, Bernheim chooses to focus on the symmetric entry deterring 
equilibrium on the grounds that the possibility of "informal communication" would lead to the 
industry settling on the equilibrium that is not Pareto dominated by the entry allowing equilibrium. 
In similar vein, Waldman (1987, 1991) adopts Bernheim's equilibrium choice rule and sets out 
to investigate whether or not, given this equilibrium choice rule, the free rider problem is important. 
While the possibility of coordination failure underinvestment is clearly understood, as evidenced 
by the discussion in Waldman (1987) of Bernheim's paper, the author's adoption of Bernheim's 
equilibrium choice rule necessarily results in coordination failure underinvestment being ruled out. 
More specifically, Waldman (1987) considers uncertainty regarding the exact investment needed to 
deter entry and demonstrates that while such uncertainty causes underinvestment in the Bernheim 
framework, introducing uncertainty in the G&V model does not change their original conclusions and 
free riding remains nonexistent. However, he defines underinvestment as the situation where the 
aggregate investment at the noncooperative equilibrium is less than that which maximizes expected 
joint profits, that is, his results refer to underinvestment of type 3 only. 
On the other hand, in the sequential entry model of Waldman (1991), underinvestment is regarded 
as the situation where allowing entry is the unique noncooperative equilibrium even though deterring 
entry is mutually more profitable for all incumbents. Thus, his conclusion that the presence of multiple 
potential entrants is crucial for underinvestment in entry deterrence is valid for type 1 underinvestment 
only. In their externalities model, Appelbaum and Weber (1992, p. 474) consider precommitments that 
can be unambiguously classified as "public goods" or "public bads" and predict that "if 
precommitments constitute 'public goods' but make incumbents 'tough', we have under-investment." 
They use the same definition of underinvestment as Waldman (1987), and so their results must be 
6 See section 3 and footnote 15 for further discussion. 
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similarly qualified. In other words, because of their approach, none of these later studies explore the 
possibility of type 2 underinvestment. 
This may be reconciled by pointing out that, owing to the methodology used, much of the later 
literature has overlooked an important feature of lumpy public goods models. Lumpy public goods 
such as entry deterrence, by their very nature, give rise to discontinuous payoffs and multiple equi 
libria along with the associated coordination failure problems.7 While first recognized by Bernheim 
(1984) and explicitly investigated by G&V, multiple Nash equilibria are ruled out in Waldman (1987) 
by the introduction of uncertainty, while the use of multiple potential entrants in Waldman (1991) 
performs a similar role. This allows the author to completely ignore situations (explicitly characterized 
by G&V) where both allowing entry and deterring entry can be equilibrium outcomes. Appelbaum 
and Weber assume concavity of each incumbent's expected profit function, an assumption that clearly 
does not hold in our model (and will not hold for cases with uncertainty that is not too large). 
Consequently, their model does not generate multiple equilibria, enabling them to sidestep the 
coordination failure problem entirely. Furthermore, their predictions on underinvestment relative to 
the collusive outcome depend crucially on their definition of a "public good" ("public bad")?both 
entry deterring profit and entry allowing profit for each incumbent must be increasing (decreasing) in 
other incumbents' precommitments. Since our differentiated product framework can have opposite 
signs for these marginal profits, Appelbaum and Weber's model cannot shed any light on free riding 
in our model. In fact, their analysis cannot even say anything conclusively about the G&V environ 
ment, where entry prevention is unambiguously a "public bad." 
We demonstrate that coordination failure underinvestment in entry prevention can arise in 
the G&V framework when products are differentiated enough. Our analysis suggests that how an 
incumbent's maximum entry deterring profit changes with respect to its rival's output holds the key to 
the free riding issue. We may conjecture that for strategic substitutes, any entry deterrence model 
characterized by a deterrence profit that is increasing in rivals' precommitments over the relevant 
range is a likely candidate for coordination failure underinvestment. Two such examples of 
precommitment equilibria models with strategic substitutes are provided at the end of the paper. The 
first model introduces increasing marginal costs into the G&V homogeneous product model and, by 
showing the equivalence with the differentiated products model, demonstrates the possibility of type 2 
underinvestment in this scenario.8 Coordination failure underinvestment is also shown to emerge in 
the second model, where incumbents precommit to cost reducing research and development (R&D) 
(prior to the entry decision) before engaging in Cournot quantity setting. 
The following section sets up our differentiated products version of the G&V model and char 
acterizes the equilibria of the game. Section 3 examines the underinvestment phenomenon, while 
section 4 outlines the increasing marginal costs model and the R&D model. The last section concludes. 
2. The Differentiated Products Model 
We consider a two-stage noncooperative game with complete information played by two 
incumbents (firms 1 and 2) and a potential entrant (firm 3). In stage 1, firms 1 and 2 precommit 
to quantity levels x\ and jc2, respectively. In stage 2, firm 3 makes its entry decision after observing 
7 
Henceforth, all references to "public goods" will be in the context of lumpy public goods. 
8 We are grateful to Xavier Vives for educating us on this issue. 
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Xi and x2. If entry occurs a fixed cost F is incurred by the entrant. All firms are assumed to have 
identical constant marginal costs of production. We focus on subgame perfect equilibria. 
We use the Vives (1985) differentiated products demand structure where an active firm i's 
inverse demand is given by 
Pi = a 
- bxi - g]P Xj] 1,7 
= 1,...?; b > g > 0; a > 0. (1) 
j?i 
in the region of quantity space where prices are positive. The number of active firms is n and gib is a 
measure of the substitutability between products, ranging from zero when the goods are independent, 
that is, when g 
= 0, to one when the goods are perfect substitutes, that is, when g 
= b. Without loss of 
generality the intercept term a is interpreted as the net of the constant marginal cost. 
Using backward induction, we first derive the entrant's decision rule. Let x3 
= 
x*3 (xu x2) be the 
entrant's optimal output if it enters. Then, assuming the entrant enters if and only if it makes a positive 
profit, we can easily derive its optimal decision rule as 
Enter (and set x3 ? x^(x\,x2)) if x\ + x2 < Z, , . 
Stay out if X\ + x2 > Z, 
where Z = (a ? 2y/bF)/g is the limit output that just deters entry. Not surprisingly, the limit output is 
decreasing in the fixed cost F that the entrant must incur to enter the industry. More interestingly, Z 
is decreasing in the substitutability parameter g, reflecting that, ceteris paribus, the greater the 
substitutability between products the less the incumbents need to produce to keep the entrant out. 
Now, consider firm l's optimization problem.9 Let x2 < Z. (If x2 > Z, firm 1 ignores the entry 
threat.) If incumbent 1 produces x\ < Z 
? 
x2, firm 3 enters with x3 = x*3 (xux2) and firm 1 earns 
nf (xx\x2) = {a 
? 
bxi 
? 
g[x2 + x*3(xi,x2)]}xi. Otherwise, if xx >Z 
? 
x2 entry does not occur and firm 1 
gets a profit of U^E(xi;x2) 
? (a 
? 
bxx 
? 
gx2)x\. Firm l's profit functions are as shown in Figure l.10 
These profit functions (the positions of which are fixed by arbitrary x2) are functions of firm l's own 
quantity. The higher curve U^E(xi;x2) shows firm l's profit if the entrant stays out. The other curve 
depicts net profit of firm 1 for various X\ when firm 3 enters and produces x*3 (jci, x2). For Xi less than 
Z ? x2, firm 1 's profit moves along Ilf (xi;x2). At xx ? Z 
? 
x2 profit jumps up to U^E(xi;x2) and stays 
on this higher curve for larger x\. 
Let rf(x2) and r^E(x2) be the (unique) maximizers of Uf(xi;x2) and ltfE(xi;x2), respectively. 
Whenever r^E(x2) + x2 > Z, firm 1 's unconstrained profit maximizing output rf E(x2) (ignoring the 
entry threat) automatically blockades entry and yields the greatest profit. Since r^E(jc2) + x2 is 
increasing in x2, there exists a unique x2 (Z) solving r^E(x2) -f- x2 = Z (see Appendix). For all x2 > 
x2 (Z), firm 1 produces r^E(x2) and entry is blockaded. 
However, for x2 < x$(Z), entry is no longer blockaded since r^E(x2) -\-x2 falls short of the limit 
output Z. Incumbent 1 can prevent entry by choosing Z 
? 
x2 or can allow entry by producing r\(jc2). We 
define n^E*(x2) = II^E(Z 
- 
x2\x2) and Ilf (*2) = nf (rf (x2);x2) as the maximum profit that firm 1 can 
earn from deterring entry and allowing entry, respectively. As shown in the Appendix, similar to G&V, 
9 We shall, henceforth, use incumbent 1 as the representative firm, keeping in mind that the case for firm 2 is exactly symmetric. 10 It may be readily verified that for positive xx, the II^E curve lies everywhere above the Iff curve and has a larger horizontal 
intercept than Iff. 
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n^n^ 
* E f NE 7 v 
ri ri Z - x2 
Figure 1. Incumbent l's "Entry" and "No Entry" Profit as a Function of Own Quantity, for Given x2 
nf*(x2) is decreasing and strictly convex in x2. However, the shape of Il^fe) can be very different 
from that in G&V. The explicit expression for firm l's maximum profit from deterring entry is 
nf 
* 
(x2) = (Z - x2)(a -bZ+[b- g]x2). (3) 
When the goods are perfect substitutes (g = b), from Equation 3 it is clear that II^e*(jc2) is linear and 
decreasing in x2t that is, we are in the G&V case. However, for smaller g, Il^E*(x2) is strictly concave, 
increasing in the rival's output until some point jcJ13* = ([2b ? g]Z ? a)/(2[b ? g]) and then 
decreasing.11 These profit functions are depicted in Figure 2. Note that at x2 
= 
xf(Z), firm l's profit 
from deterring entry must dominate that from allowing entry. This ensures a unique intersection x2(Z) 
11 Note that Z > a/(2b - g) is required for the entry deterring profit to be increasing over some positive range. Otherwise, we get 
xmax < Q an(j ?rm j's maximum entry deterring profit decreases continuously for all nonnegative x2 so that the Gilbert and 
Vives result remains valid. Hence, as claimed, their overinvestment prediction is robust to moderate amounts of product 
differentiation. 
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n,E\n,NE* 
NE* 
X2 
X2 X2^ 
Figure 2. Incumbent l's Maximum Profit from Allowing Entry and from Deterring Entry as a Function of the 
Other's Quantity 
where Y\^E*(x2) = Hf*(x2), that is, at this rival output, 1 is indifferent between allowing entry (by 
producing rf (x2(Z)) and deterring entry (by producing Z 
? 
x{(Z)).12 
Firm l's overall best response ai(.x:2) is, then (see Figure 2): 
f rffe) 
<*i(x2) = { Z-x2 
3(*2) 
when x2 G [0, x[ (Z) ], 
when x2 G [x^ (Z), xf (Z) ], 
when x2 > xf(Z), 
i.e., allow entry, 
i.e., deter entry, 
i.e., blockade entry. 
(4) 
Firm 1 's best response is shown in Figure 3. The straight line ZZ is the locus of points for which 
firm 1 and firm 2's outputs add up to exactly the limit output. Points below ZZ represent combinations 
of xi and x2 that allow entry, while points above this line denote individual outputs that deter entry. 
For low values of x2 firm 1 chooses the quantity rf(x2) that maximizes its profit from allowing entry, 
that is, entry is allowed. This is true for all x2 less than x2(Z). At x2 = x2(Z), firm 1 's best response 
jumps up to make up the difference between the limit output and firm 2's quantity, that is, entry is 
12 We define xf2 (Z) to be zero if the intersection occurs at negative x2. 
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X2 
Xl 
Figure 3. Incumbent l's Overall Best Response 
deterred. For very high values of x2 firm 1 ignores the entry threat and produces r^(x2), that is, entry 
is blockaded. 
Since the incumbent firms are symmetric, firm 2's best response may be derived in analogous 
fashion and the equilibria of this game can be identified using G&V's methodology. The 
characterization of the set of equilibria is critically dependent on x2(Z), the properties of which were 
characterized by G&V. Lemma 1 shows that these properties are robust to the introduction of product 
differentiation (see Figure 4). 
Lemma 1. Let Zm be the limit output for which a monopolist is indifferent between allowing entry 
and deterring entry. Then Zm > 0 and x2(Z) is zero on [0, Zm] and for Z > Zm, x2(Z) is increasing in Z 
with constant slope greater than unity up to a/g. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
The best response of incumbent 1 given in Equation 4 along with Lemma 1 can now be used to 
derive the equilibria in terms of the limit output Z. The (unique) entry allowing equilibrium can be 
calculated from the intersection of the incumbents' best responses when the intersection occurs at 
a point before the one at which an incumbent becomes indifferent between allowing and deterring 
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x2'(Z) 
45-degree line 
Zm Z Z a/g 
Figure 4. The Rival Output xf2 (Z) That Makes Incumbent 1 Indifferent between Allowing and Deterring Entry, as 
a Function of the Limit Output 
entry. This entry equilibrium has both firms producing equal amounts given by X\ 
= 
x2 
? 
xE. If there is 
no entry threat, both incumbents behave as unconstrained duopolists and in equilibrium produce X! 
= 
x2 = xNE. Denote the aggregate output in the unconstrained case as x^with xu 
= 
2xNE). If the limit 
output is less than xu, entry is automatically blockaded. Hence, consider Z > xu. 
Let Z be the smallest limit output for which allowing entry is an equilibrium, that is, Z solves 
x2(Z) =xE. This means that when its rival produces Xe each incumbent is indifferent between allowing 
entry (by producing Xe itself) and deterring entry (by choosing an output level of Z?Xe). Further, denote 
by Z the largest limit output for which preventing entry is an equilibrium, that is, Z solves x2(Z) = Z/2. 
Since Z/2 is greater than Xe and x2(Z) is increasing in Z, we know that Z> Z. We can now characterize 
the equilibria of this game in terms of the limit output Z as described in Proposition l.13 
Proposition 1. 
(i) When Z < xu, each incumbent produces xNE and the entrant stays out in equilibrium. Entry is 
blockaded by the oligopoly. The equilibrium is unique and symmetric. 
(ii) When xu < Z < Z, any incumbent outputs in the set D = {(xi, x2) 6 R2+: xx + x2 = Z, x2(Z) < 
X/ < Z ? x^(Z), /, j = 1, 2; / ^  j}9 and the entrant staying out is an equilibrium. The oligopoly 
prevents entry by producing exactly Z. 
13 The interested reader should refer to the Appendix for the technical details. 
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X2 
Figure 5. Incumbents' best responses for Z < Z < Z. That is, when both entry allowing and entry deterring equilibria 
coexist. 
(iii) When Z < Z < Z, either allowing entry or preventing entry is an equilibrium. If entry is 
deterred, any incumbent outputs in the set D, and the entrant staying out is an equilibrium. If 
entry is accommodated, each incumbent producing Xe and the entrant entering with an output 
of x^x^, Xe) is an equilibrium. 
(iv) When Z> Z, the unique equilibrium has each incumbent producing Xe and the entrant entering 
the industry with an output of x^x^, Xe). 
Case i of Proposition 1 tells us that when the limit output is very small, each incumbent ignores 
the threat of entry and the unconstrained equilibrium aggregate output automatically blockades entry. 
However, for larger limit outputs we get the entry deterring regime of case ii where the incumbents 
produce exactly the limit output in equilibrium. As the limit output increases further, both entry 
allowing and entry deterring equilibria are possible (case iii), while for even greater levels of limit 
output (case iv), the unique equilibrium is to allow entry. Figure 5 illustrates case iii where both 
allowing entry and deterring entry are equilibria. 
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n,E\n, 
xE x2'(Z) Z/2 Z-x2'(Z) x2b(Z) 
Figure 6. Incumbent 1 's Maximum Profit from Allowing Entry and from Deterring Entry as a Function of the Other's 
Quantity in the Gilbert and Vives Homogeneous Product Model 
3. Underinvestment with Differentiated Products 
In this section we show that underinvestment of type 2 can arise in the differentiated products 
model even though type 1 and type 3 underinvestment are absent. We state this latter fact as 
a proposition. The proof is analogous to Gilbert and Vives (1986). 
Proposition 2. There is no underinvestment of type 1 or type 3 in the differentiated products 
model. 
Let us now focus on coordination failure underinvestment. In the G&V homogeneous product 
setting, incumbent l's maximum profit from deterring entry, n^E*(jc2), is continuously decreasing in 
incumbent 2's output, as shown in Figure 6. Let Z < Z < Z, so that both allowing entry and deterring 
entry are equilibria. Then, from Proposition 1 we know that the quantity Xe that each produces at the 
entry equilibrium is less than the rival output x|(Z), for which an incumbent is indifferent between 
allowing and preventing entry. Further, in any entry deterring equilibrium, the rival output (including 
that corresponding to the symmetric deterrence equilibrium, Z/2) is greater than x2(Z). 
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Now, consider firm l's profits. If incumbent 2 produces Xe then incumbent 1, by itself choosing 
Xe and allowing entry, earns a profit at the entry equilibrium corresponding to point E on the Ilf*(x2) 
curve. We know that at any entry deterring equilibrium, x2(Z) < x2 < Z ? x2(Z) must hold. It should 
now be easy to see that for any x2(Z) < x2 < Z 
? 
x2(Z), firm 1 by producing Z 
- 
x2 earns a lower profit 
at the corresponding entry deterring equilibrium compared with the entry equilibrium profit at E since 
II^E*(x2) is continuously decreasing. In particular, incumbent l's profit at the symmetric entry 
deterring equilibrium, corresponding to point D on the II^E*(x2) curve, is always unambiguously 
lower than its profit at the entry equilibrium. By symmetric considerations firm 2 prefers the entry 
equilibrium to any of the deterrence equilibria, and, hence, the entry equilibrium always Pareto 
dominates every deterrence equilibrium in the G&V framework. This forms the gist of G&V's 
overinvestment argument. If the actual equilibrium realized in the industry deters entry, then each 
incumbent has overinvested in the sense that each would have been better off by producing less and 
allowing entry. 
Dropping the homogeneous good assumption can affect these conclusions. For sufficiently large 
amounts of product differentiation, it is now no longer necessary for an incumbent's entry deterring 
profit to be continuously decreasing in the other's output over the range of deterrence equilibria. This 
feature makes it impossible to unequivocally claim that, when both types of equilibria coexist, the 
entry equilibrium Pareto dominates every deterrence equilibrium. 
Starting from the homogeneous good case with g 
= b shown in Figure 6, an increase in product 
differentiation affects the UE*(x2) and IINE*(x2) curves in the following manner. First, a decrease in g 
shifts Ilf*(x2) upward, but the curve continues to retain its decreasing convex shape. On the other 
hand, increasing the degree of product differentiation introduces concavity into the II^E*(x2) curve but 
keeps the vertical intercept unchanged.14 More specifically, starting from g 
= b, as g decreases, the 
deterrence profit function becomes concave with the new curve lying everywhere above the original 
one except at zero rival output. As the degree of differentiation keeps increasing, the I1^e*(jc2) curve 
becomes more and more concave until, after exceeding a certain critical level, it becomes upward 
sloping at x2 
= 0.15 
Hence, for sufficiently differentiated products, we get the situation depicted in Figure 7 where 
both entry allowing and entry preventing equilibria coexist and incumbent l's maximum entry 
deterring profit is increasing at x2(Z), that is, the rival output at which it is indifferent between 
accommodating entry and deterring entry. Recall thatx2ax is the rival output for which firm 1 's profit 
from deterring entry reaches a maximum, and assume that this maximum entry deterring profit 
II^E*(x2nax) is greater than firm l's profit at the entry equilibrium UE*(xE).16 
Here again, in any entry deterring equilibrium x2(Z) < x2 < Z 
? 
x2(Z) must hold. However, now, 
in contrast to the G&V scenario, at any entry deterring equilibrium where x2 is sufficiently large 
incumbent 1 is strictly better off relative to the entry equilibrium; for instance, if incumbent 2 
produces half the limit output, Z/2, then incumbent l's equilibrium profit at D is strictly greater than 
that at E. This implies that the entry equilibrium does not Pareto dominate the symmetric entry 
deterring equilibrium. In fact, in this case, at the symmetric entry deterring equilibrium, both 
14 We thank an anonymous referee for helping us sharpen this discussion. 
15 The first partial of maximum entry allowing profit with respect to g is -[(2b - g)(a 
- 
gx2)][(2b - g)(2b2 - g2)x2 + 2b(a ? 
gx2)(b ? g)]/[4b(2b2 ? g2)2], which is negative for all rival outputs. As for the deterrence profit function, the first partial with 
respect to g is -(Z - x2)x2, which is negative for all x2 > 0. The first derivative of deterrence profit with respect to x2 is (2b ~ 
g)Z - a ? 2(b - g)x2, and this term is positive at x2 = 0 when g < 2b ? a/Z. Note that the fixed cost is being adjusted 
accordingly to keep the limit output constant. 
16 If this condition is not satisfied, the entry equilibrium will, obviously, Pareto dominate every entry deterring equilibrium. 
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xE x2'(Z) Z/2 x2max Z-x2'(Z) 
Figure 7. Incumbent l's Maximum Profit from Allowing Entry and from Deterring Entry as a Function of the Other's 
Quantity When Its Entry Deterring Profit Is Increasing at x2(Z) 
incumbents earn a profit represented by D and, hence, the symmetric entry deterring equilibrium 
Pareto dominates the entry equilibrium. Underinvestment of type 2, or coordination failure 
underinvestment, arises. 
Note that the rising portion of firm l's entry deterring profit function IlfE*(x2) plays a crucial 
role in the emergence of coordination failure underinvestment in the differentiated products model. 
However, if the entry deterring profit curve n^E*(x2) intersects the entry allowing profit curve nf*(x2) 
after it has started decreasing then this type of underinvestment cannot arise, as illustrated in Figure 8. 
The reasoning is similar to that given above for the nonexistence of type 2 free riding in the G&V 
model. This is formally stated in Proposition 3 below. 
Proposition 3. Let Z < Z < Z, so that both entry allowing and entry deterring equilibria exist. 
Then, V /, j = 1, 2; / ^  j\ a necessary condition for coordination failure underinvestment is that an 
incumbent's maximum profit from deterring entry UfE*(Xj) be increasing in the other's output at the 
point where it is indifferent between allowing entry and deterring entry. 
Proof. Suppose Z < Z < Z but xfax < x2(Z). From Proposition l(iii), Xe < x2(Z), and since 
Uf*(Xj) is decreasing in Xy, nf*(x^) > Hf*(x2(Z)). Since UfE*(xj) is decreasing in Xj for x, > x2(Z), 
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n,E*,n, 
x2max xE x2'(Z) Z/2 Z-x2'(Z) 
Figure 8. Incumbent l's Maximum Profit from Allowing Entry and from Deterring Entry as a Function of the Other's 
Quantity When Its Entry Deterring Profit Is Decreasing at x2(Z) 
U^E*(x{(Z)) > U^iXj) V xj e [x|(Z),xf (Z)]. Now, using the fact that Uf*(x{(Z)) > UfE*(x[(Z)) and 
that Xj > x2(Z), we get Ilf*(xE) > nfE*(x/). Hence, the entry equilibrium Pareto dominates every 
deterrence equilibrium and there can never be any underinvestment of type 2. QED. 
A numerical example of type 2 underinvestment is presented in Table 1. Here, the demand 
parameter a, is normalized to unity and b is set equal to 2. Choosing a limit output of Z = 0.52, the 
degree of substitutability, g, is allowed to vary, and for every g, the fixed cost, F, is chosen so as to 
maintain the limit output at 0.52. The chosen parameters ensure that both entry allowing and entry 
deterring equilibria coexist (Z<Z<Z) and that each incumbent's maximum profit from deterring 
entry is increasing in the other's output at the point where it is indifferent between allowing entry and 
deterring entry (x2(Z) < xf**). When g = 1.1, the entry equilibrium Pareto dominates the symmetric 
entry deterring equilibrium. However, unlike G&V, the entry equilibrium does not Pareto dominate 
every entry deterring equilibrium. Each incumbent would prefer the deterrence equilibrium where it 
produces Z 
? 
x 
** 
and the other produces x *. As g decreases, starting from g 
? 
1.05, this gets 
reversed and it is clear that each incumbent's profit in the symmetric entry deterring equilibrium is 
greater than its profit at the entry allowing equilibrium. Thus, the symmetric entry deterring 
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Table 1. Comparison of Incumbent 1 's Profit at the Entry Allowing Equilibrium, the Symmetric 
Entry Deterring Equilibrium, and the Profit from Deterring Entry When Rival Produces x2Tiax, as the 
Degree of Product Differentiation, g, Varies from 0.8 to 1.1, for a 
= 1, b = 2, and z = 0.52 
g F Z Z Xe x?(Z) Z/2 xfax Z 
- 
x[(Z) ufe**) n?E*(Z/2) n?E*Cr!?ax) 
0.8 0.0426 0.5156 0.5921 0.1852 0.1915 0.26 0.2767 0.3285 0.0631 0.0707 0.0711 
0.85 0.0389 0.5131 0.5870 0.1828 0.1932 0.26 0.2774 0.3268 0.0608 0.0673 0.0677 
0.9 0.0354 0.5105 0.5817 0.1805 0.1952 0.26 0.2782 0.3248 0.0586 0.0640 0.0643 
0.95 0.0320 0.5080 0.5763 0.1784 0.1978 0.26 0.2790 0.3222 0.0565 0.0606 0.0610 
1.0 0.0288 0.5054 0.5708 0.1765 0.2008 0.26 0.28 0.3192 0.0545 0.0572 0.0576 
1.05 0.0258 0.5028 0.5653 0.1746 0.2043 0.26 0.2811 0.3157 0.0526 0.0538 0.0542 
1.1 0.0229 0.5003 0.5596 0.1729 0.2084 0.26 0.2822 0.3116 0.0508 0.0504 0.0509 
equilibrium Pareto dominates the entry allowing equilibrium. Hence, there is coordination failure 
underprovision of public goods. 
4. Other Examples of Coordination Failure Underinvestment 
This section briefly discusses two other models that exhibit coordination failure underinvest 
ment. Our purpose is to show that this type of underinvestment can be prevalent in a variety of models 
with precommitment equilibria and should, hence, be studied in greater depth. 
The Increasing Marginal Costs Model 
Our first model (to be called the increasing marginal costs model) retains the homogeneous 
product structure of the G&V model but relaxes the constant marginal costs assumption. We consider 
an industry characterized by linear demand for a homogeneous good and quadratic costs of production 
where the incumbents precommit to quantities before the entrant makes its entry decision. The 
intuition for underinvestment in this framework is as follows. Here, as in the G&V model, whenever 
entry is deterred the price is constant and invariant to how the limit output is distributed among the 
incumbents. However, unlike G&V, as an incumbent's share of the limit output expands it incurs 
increasingly larger costs of production. Consequently, when the additional revenue from a unit 
increase in output is more than offset by the additional cost of producing that unit, an incumbent's 
entry deterring profit decreases in own output or, equivalently, its deterrence profit increases in rival's 
output. When this happens, producing the entire limit output is too costly for any single incumbent 
and the incentive to have the largest share in the limit output is attenuated?a setting that is conducive 
to the emergence of underinvestment. 
Formally demonstrating the existence of coordination failure underinvestment in the increasing 
marginal costs model is simply a matter of invoking the equivalence under quantity competition, 
observed by Vives (1990), between differentiated products with constant marginal costs and 
homogeneous products with increasing marginal costs. Let inverse demand for the homogeneous 
good be 
p^a-y^; y=l,.../z; y 
> 0, a > 0, (5) 
j 
where n is the number of active firms, and let C(x?) = 8x? be each firm's total cost function. Then, firm 
i's profit is given by 
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?li(xhx-i) = ( a 
-Y^Xj JXi 
- 
hxf, 
ILi(xhX-i) = ?-(y + ?^-Y^*, J& J 
(6) 
Note that Equation 6 corresponds to quantity competition with differentiated products and constant 
marginal costs if we interpret the intercept term as net of the marginal cost. In fact, for oc 
= 
a, y 
= 
g, 
and 8 = b ? g, Equation 6 is identical to a firm's profit in our differentiated products model. With the 
same type of analysis, it can be verified that for sufficiently steep marginal costs, underinvestment of 
type 2 can also arise in the homogeneous good case. Here, too, this type of underinvestment can occur 
only if an incumbent's entry deterring profit is increasing in the other's output at the point where it is 
indifferent between allowing entry and preventing entry. However, the G&V overinvestment result 
remains robust to moderately increasing marginal costs. 
The dampening effect of increasing marginal costs on entry preventing incentives is also found, 
in a different but related context, in the sequential entry model of Vives (1988). He considers a model 
with a single incumbent and a pool of potential entrants sequentially choosing outputs in 
a homogenous good industry before the market clears. With constant marginal cost of production, the 
incumbent never allows entry of any firms that will subsequently deter further entry, since it prefers 
producing the entire limit output itself. However, with increasing marginal costs, if the pool of 
potential entrants is large and marginal costs are increasing, producing the limit output may be too 
costly and so the incumbent may not want to be the sole entry preventer. 
The R&D Model 
The second model (to be called the R&D model) is adapted from D'Aspremont and Jacquemin 
(1988) and considers a simple two-stage game where two symmetric incumbents precommit to pro 
duction cost reducing R&D levels before the entry decision takes place. Though the cost of invest 
ment, assumed quadratic, is incurred in the first stage, the R&D choice determines production costs 
for the subsequent period. The second stage is characterized by simultaneous (Cournot) quantity set 
ting with the entrant facing an avoidable fixed entry cost. The strategic variable here is similar to the 
strategic variable, quantity, of the G&V model, and the differentiated products model in that R&D, 
too, is a strategic substitute. That is, in the absence of any entry threat, the best responses are down 
ward sloping. Now, instead of a limit output there exists a critical aggregate amount of cost reduction 
that if undertaken by the industry deters entry. 
More specifically, we assume an inverse linear demand curve given by P = Max{0, 1 ? Q} 
where Q is the aggregate output produced in the second stage. The incumbents' production costs are 
represented by C? (q?, x?) = [a ? x?] q?, i = 1, 2; where a (0, 1) and x? G [0, a]. This formulation yields 
constant unit costs for the incumbents of c?(= a 
? 
x?), / = 1, 2, for any given prior investment choice. 
The entrant is assumed to have a constant unit cost of c3 = a. The cost of investment is assumed to 
be quadratic of the form bx] with b > 0, reflecting the existence of diminishing returns to R&D 
expenditures. These assumptions allow us to explicitly derive the entry deterring critical investment as 
a sum of the incumbents' investments. 
The analysis of the cost reducing game is entirely analogous to the differentiated products model 
and delivers the same conclusions. We again get coordination failure underinvestment for the 
following reason. If an incumbent's R&D decreases (and the other's R&D increases) in moving from 
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one entry deterring equilibrium to another, its production costs rise and its gross (Cournot) profit is 
reduced relative to the initial deterrence equilibrium. However, for large investment cost coefficients, 
the fall in investment costs may be so significant as to actually increase its net profit. Consequently, an 
incumbent's equilibrium deterrence profit can be initially increasing in its rival's R&D before tapering 
off and decreasing over the rest of the domain. When this happens, similar to the differentiated 
products framework, the incumbent may no longer want the largest possible share in the critical 
aggregate investment, and type 2 underinvestment may occur?the entry equilibrium may not Pareto 
dominate every deterrence equilibrium. More specifically, we may demonstrate that this type of 
underinvestment can occur only if each incumbent's entry deterring profit is increasing in its rival's 
R&D at the point where it is indifferent between allowing entry and preventing entry. 
While this paper has focused on entry deterring variables that are strategic substitutes, 
coordination failure may also occur with strategic complements. For instance, we may conjecture that 
underinvestment is possible in a differentiated products industry where incumbents can credibly 
precommit to prices in the preentry period and the entrant stays out if incumbent prices are low 
enough.17 The intuition is that when entry is prevented, a decrease in an incumbent's price enhances 
demand for its product but reduces the price received per unit sold such that its deterrence profit may 
decrease in the other's price and may reduce its incentive to have the smallest possible "share" in the 
limit price?a setting that may be conducive to underinvestment. While the realism of this scenario 
may be open to debate given the questionable commitment value of prices as entry deterring variables, 
it does serve to buttress our conviction that coordination failure underinvestment in entry deterrence is 
prevalent in a wide variety of settings and deserves a closer study.18 
5. Conclusion 
This paper demonstrates that sufficiently large amounts of product differentiation can generate 
coordination failure underinvestment in entry deterrence, that is, even though there exists an entry 
deterring equilibrium, imperfect coordination of incumbents' actions may result in an equilibrium 
where entry is allowed and all incumbents earn lower profits. This type of underinvestment, first 
discussed by Bernheim (1984) and explicitly investigated by Gilbert and Vives (1986), has been 
ignored by the later literature. We show that with sufficiently differentiated products, an incumbent's 
entry deterring profit increases in the other's quantity (in the relevant region) and weakens its incentive 
to have the largest share in the limit output, thus generating underinvestment. Gilbert and Vives' type 2 
overinvestment result rests critically on the dual assumptions of a homogeneous product and a constant 
marginal cost. Our analysis shows that relaxing the homogenous product assumption can generate 
coordination failure underinvestment. Also, our increasing marginal cost model shows that sufficiently 
17 This conjecture may be verified by using the demand structure of Shubik (1980) q? = {a ? b[pi + g(p? ? p)]}/n, where p = 
($2Pi)/n is the average of all prices phi=l,... n, n is the total number of active firms in the industry, and g is a measure of the 
substitutability between products (g > 0). This demand structure yields the entry preventing price combination as an aggregate 
of the incumbents' prices and is consequently amenable to the methodology employed throughout this paper. 18 We have also looked at an advertising model by Shubik (1980), which examines a three-stage game where two symmetric 
incumbents in a differentiated products industry commit to market share enhancing advertising outlays in the first stage. In the 
second stage, the entrant chooses its advertising level and pays an entry cost if it decides to enter. Simultaneous price 
competition occurs in the final stage. Each incumbent's advertising outlay turns out to be a strategic complement (upward 
sloping best response) over smaller values of the other's advertising and a strategic substitute over larger values of the rival's 
advertising level. Our analysis reveals that there is never any type 2 underinvestment in the advertising model since each 
incumbent's equilibrium entry preventing profit is monotonically decreasing in the other's advertising. 
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steep marginal costs can also result in type 2 underinvestment. However, for moderate amounts of 
product differentiation and moderately steep marginal costs, each incumbent still wants the largest 
share in the limit output and G&V s overinvestment result remains valid. 
We believe that coordination failure equilibria are common in settings with lumpy public goods 
and should receive more attention in the entry deterrence context. In keeping with this view, we outline 
two other models of entry deterrence?an increasing marginal costs model and an R&D model? 
where, again, underinvestment is caused by weakening an incumbent's incentive to produce the entire 
limit investment. Our analysis suggests that coordination failure underinvestment can occur for 
strategic substitutes only if the private benefit from the public good?deterred entry?is increasing in 
the rival incumbent's precommitment variable over the relevant region. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that introducing uncertainty into our model may have interest 
ing implications for the free rider problem. Waldman (1987) shows that though the introduction of 
uncertainty into the G&V framework does not result in underinvestment, adding uncertainty to the 
Bernheim model causes every equilibrium to be characterized by the free rider problem with its 
resulting underinvestment. Since introducing product differentiation into the G&V model produces 
type 2 underinvestment, it may be conjectured that differentiated products in conjunction with un 
certainty would result in the possibility of a unique underinvestment equilibrium.19 The investiga 
tion of this issue shall be taken up in future research on the free rider problem in noncooperative 
entry deterrence. 
Appendix 
1. We show there exists a unique x2(Z) such that entry is blockaded for all x2 > x2(Z). 
Maximization of nfE(x!;jc2) yields r^fo) = (a 
? 
gx2)/(2b) with a slope oi-g/2b, where -1 < ?glib < 0. Thus, r^fo) + 
x2 is increasing in x2 and there is a unique solution x2(Z) = (2bZ 
? 
a)l(2b ? g) solving the equation r^iE(x2) + x2 = Z, such that 1 
ignores the entry threat and produces r^E(x2) for all x2 > x2(Z). 
2. We show nf*(x2) is decreasing and convex in x2, n^E*(jt2) is strictly concave in x2, and we derive their intersection 
point 
-4(Z)- We also derive analytic expressions for Xe, xnb, Z, and Z. 
For x\<Z 
? 
x2, the entrant enters with an output of x\ (xl,x2)= [a 
- 
g(xx -\-x2)]/(2b) and we get Ilf (x^) ? [(2b 
- 
g)(a ? 
gx2)xi - (2b2 - g2)x\]l(2b). Maximizing this with respect to xx yields rf (x2) = [(2b 
? 
g)/(4b2 ? 2g2)](a - gx2), which is downward 
sloping with a slope greater than ?1. Substituting for rf (x2), we get nf*(x2) = [(2b 
- 
g)2(a - gx2)2]l[%b(2b2 ? g2)], which is 
clearly decreasing and convex in x2. On the other hand, the first and second partials of lij?te) = (Z 
? 
x2)[a ? bZ-\-(b ? g)x2] 
show that it is concave in x2 and attains a maximum at x 
ax = ([2b ? g]Z - a)l(2[b ? g\). Since ltfE*(x2 (Z)) > Uf*(x2(Z)), we get 
4(Z) = max(0,[?i 
- 
2aE3 + (E2 + 2gE3)Z]/D) as the unique intersection of II?E* and Ilf*such that I1*E* > Ilf* for x2 > x*2(Z) 
and I1?E* < Ilf, otherwise. (D, Eu E2, and E3 are all functions of a, b, and g given by D = (-Ab2 + 2bg + g2)2, Ex = -Sab3 + 
Aab2g + ag3, E2 = 16b4 
- 
Sb3g 
- 
%b2g2 + 4bg3, and E3 = >j2b2g{Sb3 
- 6b2g 
- 
Abg2 + 3g3)). 
Since rf (x2) and rf (xi) are downward sloping with a slope greater than -1, their intersection is unique and yields xF = a(2b 
- 
g)l[2(2b2 - g2) + g(2b 
? 
g)], the output produced by each incumbent in the entry equilibrium. Similarly, the intersection of 
f^(x2) and r^ixi) is also unique and is given by xNE = a/(2b + g)- Under blockaded entry, both incumbents behave as 
unconstrained duopolists and in equilibrium produce x^=x2 = xNE. Recall that Z solves xJ2(Z)=xE and Z solves xI2(Z) = Z/2. 
Explicit calculations yield Z = [Dx* 
- (Ex - 2aE3)]/(E2 + 2gE3) and Z = [ - 2(EX ~ 2aE3)]l[2(E2 + 2gE3) - D]. 
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof follows Gilbert and Vives (1986). First, we show that Zm is positive. If xm is the monopoly 
output then Zm > xm must hold because for any Z < xm a monopolist would always prefer to deter entry. So Zm must be positive. 
Here, Zm = (a/2b)(l + yj\ 
- [{2b - gf/2{2b2 - g1)}) and xm = a/2b. Second, to show that xf2(Z) is zero for all Z on the interval [0, 
Zm], consider any Z < Zm. If xl2(Z) > 0 then, since firm 1 's entry allowing profit is decreasing in x2, ltfE* < Ilf* at a zero rival 
output. This implies that a monopolist would prefer to allow entry, which contradicts the fact that Z < Zm. So, x!2(Z) must be zero 
for all Z on [0, Zm]. Third, we show that xI2(a/g) = alg. When Z = al g and x2 < a/g, then deterring entry makes incumbent l's 
19 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
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price zero and so it always prefers allowing entry to preventing entry. Hence, it is indifferent between accommodation and 
deterrence only when its rival produces a/g, which implies that x2(a/g) = a/g. 
Finally, we prove that x?2(Z) is increasing with constant slope greater than unity on [Zm, a/g]. For Zm< Z < a/g, xf2(Z) = 
[Ex - 2aE3 + (E2 + 2gE3)Z]/D and dxI2/dZ = (E2 + 2gE3)/D, or, equivalently, dx!2/dZ = (\6b4 
- 
8b3g 
- 
%b2g2 + 4bg3 + 2g?3)/[16??4 
- 
Sb3g 
- 
8??V + 4bg3 + (g4 - Sb3g + 4b2g2)]. Now, E3 can be rewritten as 
^2b2g(2b2 -g2)(4b-3g) 
> 0, while \6b4 - &b3g 
- 
8?>V + 4bg3 = Sb3(b -g) + Sb2(b2 
- 
g2) + 46g3 > 0. So, the numerator of dx2/dZ is positive. Recall that the denominator D is 
positive. Further, (g4 - Sb3g + 4b2g2) = - g(4b3 
- 
g3 + 4Z?2(/> - ?)) < 0 and, hence, ( 16b4 - 8Z?3# 
- 
8&V + 4/??3 + 2gE3)/[ 16??4 
- 
8?>3g 
- 
8/?Y + 4?>g3 + (g4 - %b3g + 4?>2g2)] > 1. QED. 
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